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BOWERS v. HARDWICK: THE SUPREME COURT REDEFINES
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Since ratification of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution,' the Supreme Court has struggled to determine the scope
of the amendment's generalized restrictions on the power of the states
to regulate the activity of their citizenry.2 In the first hundred years of
1. The fourteenth amendment, section 1, provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment was one of three
passed in the years following the Civil War. The states ratified the thirteenth
amendment, abolishing involuntary servitude, in 1865. The fourteenth amend-
ment was ratified in 1868, and the fifteenth amendment, establishing the right to
vote regardless of race, was ratified in 1870. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 415-21 (1978).
2. The struggle to define the liberty protected by the due process clause
finds its roots in the tension between judicial restraint, with the Court's scope of
review limited by the text of the Constitution and evidence of the Framer's in-
tent, and the opposing concept of the Constitution as a living document, with
the Court free to actively flesh out the document's open-ended clauses.
Much scholarly work has been produced in an attempt to answer the ques-
tion of how the Supreme Court should determine what the Constitution means.
See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY (1977); A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1976); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION,
THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Alexander, Painting Without Numbers:
Noninterpretive Judicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 447 (1983); Berger, Michael
Perry's FunctionalJustificationforJudicial Activism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 465 (1983);
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1955); Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383 (1985); Brest, Inter-
pretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Dworkin, The Forum of Prin-
ciple, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981); Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177
(1985); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Gordon,
Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1017 (1981); Grey, The Constitution as
Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fun-
damental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); Grey,
Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Levinson, Law
as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982); Levy, The Legacy Reexamined, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 767 (1985); Maltz, Murder in the Cathedral-The Supreme Court as Moral
Prophet, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 623 (1983); McIntosh, Legal Hermeneutics: A Philo-
sophical Critique, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1982); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981); Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 279 (1985); Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What it Al-
(221)
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fourteenth amendment jurisprudence, two distinct lines of cases
emerged in the Court's attempt to define the liberty protected by the
due process clause. One line of cases focused on the liberty and due
process interests implicated by state economic and social legislation,3
ways Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977); Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition
and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551
(1985); Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 261 (1981); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693
(1976); Richards, Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The Promise of Change
and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 295 (1979);
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981); Saphire,
Making Noninterpretivism Respectable: MichaelJ Perry's Contributions to Constitutional
Theory, 81 MICH. L. REV. 782 (1983); Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the
Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482
(1985); Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 683 (1985); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
3. The first interpretation of section 1 of the amendment came with the
Supreme Court's decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). The
decision involved a state-sanctioned monopoly on the slaughterhouse business
in New Orleans, and the Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Louisiana's ruling
upholding the law creating the exclusive charter. Id. at 83. In applying the due
process clause to the facts, the Court held that the restraint on the trade of the
butchers of Louisiana, who were not allowed to engage in their craft within the
New Orleans area, did not deprive them of property without due process of law.
Id. at 80-81.
Twenty-five years later the Court began to define the liberties protected
against state regulation by the due process clause, holding that the liberty to
contract for insurance was protected under the fourteenth amendment. All-
geyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). Allgeyer involved a citizen of Louisiana
who wished to insure property in Louisiana through a foreign insurer that had
not complied with Louisiana law. The contract was entered into beyond the
limits of the state. The state wished to infringe on the citizen's right to contract
with the foreign insurer. Id. at 584-85, 588-89.
The Court ruled that the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment "is
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen.., to pursue any livelihood or avoca-
tion, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, neces-
sary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes
above mentioned." Id. at 589. The Court further stated that the extent of the
legitimate exercise of the police power of the state "must be left for determina-
tion to each case as it arises." Id. at 590.
The Court then embarked on a new course ofjudicial review, typified by the
landmark case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the
Court invalidated a New York law limiting the maximum hours a baker could
work, holding that the statute interfered with the freedom to contract, and stated
that "[t]he general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of
the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Fed-
eral Constitution." Id. at 53 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)).
Justice Holmes dissented, reasoning that the Constitution was not intended
to express a particular economic theory, regardless of the substance of the the-
ory. Justice Holmes believed that the Constitution "is made for people of funda-
mentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural
and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitu-
tion of the United States." Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Justice Holmes proposed a different mode of analysis:
2
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and the other line of cases grappled with the dilemma of incorporation,
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is per-
verted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people
and our law.
Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The Court, during the era of economic substantive due process, invalidated
both state and federal laws as violative of the due process clause of the four-
teenth and fifth amendments, respectively. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S.
1 (1915) (invalidating state law prohibiting anti-union employment contracts);
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating federal law prohibiting
anti-union employment contracts). The Court did uphold some laws when the
state demonstrated factually that the law was justified by a valid purpose. See,
e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding state law limiting work
hours for men in specific industries); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
(upholding state law regulating work hours for women).
The changing political and economic landscape of America in the 1930's set
the stage for a shift in the direction of the Supreme Court's fourteenth amend-
ment interpretation and led to a reversal of the Court's approach to judicial
review under the due process clause. The Court had invalidated several New
Deal federal economic measures which affected transactions within the domain
of state power, generally under a narrow interpretation of the commerce power
of Congress as established by article I, section 8 of the Constitution. The Court
subsequently struck down a New York law creating a process for establishing
minimum wage levels for women workers in the state in Morehead v. New York
ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
Soon after Morehead, legislation was introduced in Congress which would
have allowed the President to appoint an additional justice for each justice on
the Court who had failed to retire after reaching the age of seventy and had
served ten years on the Court. H.R. Doc. No. 142, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
This proposal, referred to popularly as Roosevelt's court packing plan, would
have allowed a maximum of fifteen Supreme Court justices but was never en-
acted. For a discussion of the plan to alter the structure of the Supreme Court,
see B. F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 200-08
(1967).
In the pivotal year of 1937, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), the Supreme Court upheld a Washington law authorizing the fixing of
minimum wages for women and minors, and overruled Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating similar law). Parrish, 300 U.S. at 400.
The Court recognized that "freedom of contract is a qualified and not an abso-
lute right." Id. at 392 (quoting Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S.
549, 567 (1911)). The Court further noted that the power to restrict freedom of
contract could be exercised in the public interest regarding contracts between
employer and employee. Id. at 392-93. See Chambers, The Big Switch: Justice Rob-
erts and the Minimum Wage Cases, 10 LABOR HISTORY 44 (Winter, 1969).
The Supreme Court further altered the concept of substantive due process
review in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The
Court in Carolene rejected a due process challenge to the constitutionality of a
federal law prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of "filled milk,"
milk compounded with fat or oil other than milk fat. Id. at 145-46. Regarding
the rational basis for the law, the Court stated:
The existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be pre-
sumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transac-
tions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in light of the
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to
1987] NOTE
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and focused on which protections of the Bill of Rights applied to limit
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within
the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
Id. at 152.
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the concept of economic substantive
due process review ten years later in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwest-
ern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). In Lincoln Federal, the Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of a Nebraska constitutional amendment and a North
Carolina statute that essentially provided that no person in those states would be
denied an opportunity to secure or retain employment because of his member-
ship in a labor union. Id. at 527-28. The Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the provisions at issue and noted that "[t]his Court ... has steadily
rejected the due process philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of
cases." Id. at 536. The Court recognized a return to an "earlier constitutional
principle" under which "the due process clause is no longer to be so broadly
construed that the Congress and state legislatures are put in a straitjacket when
they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which they regard as
offensive to the public welfare." Id. at 536-37; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). In Williamson, the Court considered the constitution-
ality of an Oklahoma law regulating prescriptive optical care. Id. at 485 n. 1.
The Court upheld the validity of the statute and seemed to go so far as to hy-
pothesize reasons establishing a rational basis for the law and stated that "[i]t is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought
that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." Id. at
488.
Williamson demonstrated the complete shift in the Court's approach to judi-
cial review of general economic and social legislation. In Lochner, the Court
looked behind the stated purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute and
considered what the true intent was. 198 U.S. at 64. In Williamson, the Court
stated that if it could imagine a purpose for the statute and it furthered that
purpose, the statute would not be held to violate the due process clause. Wil-
liamson thus signified a drastic shift in the process ofjudicial review of social and
economic legislation.
Ultimately, the Court's aggressive inquiry into the rational basis of state
laws regulating general social and economic matters shifted to a reluctance on
the part of the Court to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legisla-
tion." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (quoting Day-Brite Light-
ing, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)).
The Court in Ferguson upheld the constitutionality of a Kansas law restrict-
ing the practice of the business of debt adjustment. Id. at 731-33. The Court
recounted its previous use of the due process clause "to strike down laws which
were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular
economic or social philosophy." Id. at 729. The Court noted that such a doc-
trine had "long since been discarded," and that the Court had "returned to the
original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies." Id. at 730. This was the
approach set forth by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Lochner almost sixty years
earlier. 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
For a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court's struggle to define four-
teenth amendment liberty through substantive due process review, see Preston
& Mehlman, The Due Process Clause as a Limitation on the Reach of State Legislation:
An Historical and Analytical Examination of Substantive Due Process, 8 U. BALT. L. REv.
1 (1978). For a discussion of the relationship of substantive due process review
as exemplified in the privacy cases to the Court's earlier application of the doc-
trine, see Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of
Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293 (1986).
[Vol. 32: p. 221
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the states' power under the amendment.
4
In 1965, the Supreme Court began a process of redefining funda-
mental liberties 5 protected by the fourteenth amendment, recognizing a
4. The Court considered the proper application of the guarantees con-
tained in the Bill of Rights to state legislation under the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause, and developed a rationale for determining which of
these enumerated rights were fundamental and thus protected under the
amendment. The Court described such fundamental rights as those which were
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," and stated that the source of the
fourteenth amendment protection of certain rights is "the belief that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (rejecting claim that double jeopardy clause was appli-
cable against states under fourteenth amendment). But see Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy clause applied to states).
The Court has recognized numerous fourteenth amendment fundamental
rights clearly deriving their source from guarantees enumerated in the first eight
amendments to the Constitution. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967) (right to speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to
confront witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (freedom from com-
pelled self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to
counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule ap-
plied to states); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (freedom from unreasona-
ble search and seizure); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to public trial);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (applying mandate of non-estab-
lishment of religion against states); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (applying right of free exercise of religion against states); Dejonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (right of assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931) (freedom of press); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (freedom of
speech applied against states under fourteenth amendment).
Regarding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court has noted that "[i]n resolving conflicting claims concerning the
meaning of this spacious language, the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill
of Rights for guidance." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).
5. While the Supreme Court did eventually retreat from the activism of the
Lochner era, certain rights which were recognized by the Court during that era of
active judicial review continued to receive protection under the amendment's
due process clause. The Court did not overrule prior cases which protected the
right to direct the upbringing and education of one's children. See, e.g., Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating state law requiring parents
to send their children to public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (reversing conviction of teacher for violating state law against instruction
of elementary school students in foreign language).
Additionally, the Court recognized a fundamental right of marriage and
procreation in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
This case involved a sterilization statute aimed at recidivist felons, and the Court
invalidated the statute on equal protection grounds. Id. at 536-38. The Skinner
Court emphasized that the statute irreparably affected a basic liberty and applied
strict scrutiny in holding that the law effected invidious discrimination. Id. at
541.
Additionally, the Court has recognized several areas of activity, not explic-
itly protected in the Constitution and not properly classified under the concept
of privacy rights, as fundamental rights the regulation of which calls for strict
judicial scrutiny. These rights include freedom of association, in NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (reversing state civil contempt
judgment for failure to disclose membership lists, when compelling disclosure of
5
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constitutional right of privacy.6 The Court has since declared that cer-
tain areas of activity and decisionmaking7 are generally beyond the
reach of legitimate governmental regulation and control.8
In the recent case of Bowers v. Hardwick,9 the Court was faced with
the question of whether a previously unrecognized area of activity and
decisionmaking, the right to intimate association,' 0 fell within the pro-
tection of the constitutional right of privacy under current due process
clause principles." This Note examines the analysis employed in the
privacy cases and in Hardwick, and attempts to demonstrate the impact
and meaning of the Hardwick rationale in light of the earlier cases. This
Note submits that while claiming allegiance to current due process
clause principles and to notions of judicial restraint, 12 the majority in
Hardwick redefines the process of fundamental rights analysis and cre-
such lists would infringe upon "free enjoyment of the right to associate"); the
right to vote, in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invali-
dating state poll tax under fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause);
and the right to interstate travel, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(invalidating states' prohibition of welfare benefits to residents of less than one
year as violative of equal protection clause).
6. The Supreme Court's recognition of non-enumerated rights as funda-
mental and within the scope of the liberty protected against state regulation by
the due process clause took a giant step in 1965 with the landmark case of Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court invalidated a
Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives as unconstitutional when
applied to married persons and their physicians. Id. at 485-86. The Court held
that the state law violated the right of privacy inherent in the marital relation-
ship. Id.
7. Since Griswold, the Court has recognized such protected areas as mar-
riage, in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating miscegenation stat-
ute); procreational choice, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating
abortion restrictions), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating
restrictions on distribution of contraceptives); and the family, in Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating zoning ordinance which re-
strictively defined permissible family occupation of single dwelling).
8. The test formulated by the Court is essentially that regulation of a funda-
mental right must be justified by a compelling state interest, and must be nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that interest. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973).
9. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (5-4 decision). For a recent discussion of Bowers
v. Hardwick, see The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv.
100, 210 (1986).
10. In Hardwick, the Court faced the question of whether the fourteenth
amendment protected the right to engage in adult, consensual, homosexual sod-
omy in the privacy of one's home. Respondent Hardwick had successfully ap-
pealed the dismissal of his challenge to a Georgia sodomy statute in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct.
at 2843 (citing Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985)).
11. Prior to Hardwick, the Court had stated that the issue of whether the
Constitution protected all adult, private, consensual sexual activity was un-
resolved. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977).
12. The Hardwick Court rejected the claim that the Georgia sodomy statute
violated Hardwick's fundamental constitutional rights, and justified its decision
by proclaiming its reluctance to expand the substantive scope of the due process
clause. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
6
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ates a new test for the determination of what constitutes liberty under
the fourteenth amendment.' 3
II. BACKGROUND
The Zones of Protected Activity and Decisionmaking Recognized Under the Due
Process Clause
In cases recognizing that certain conduct was protected from regu-
lation absent a compelling state interest, under the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Supreme Court has focused its inquiry on the abstract
fundamental right implicated by the regulation of the conduct at issue,
rather than on the specific conduct or activity itself. Even before the
Court described the personal liberty protected by the due process clause
as the right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut,' 4 earlier decisions had
sketched the contours of the fundamental rights deserving of protection
through heightened judicial review. 15
The Court has recognized three main zones of protected activity
and decisionmaking in its fundamental rights analysis under the due
process clause. These areas include decisions regarding marriage, 16 the
family, 17 and procreational choice.' 8 This section examines the issues
raised and resolved in the cases that have focused on the protection of
such non-enumerated fundamental rights under the fourteenth amend-
ment, and explores the reasoning of the Court in discovering and recog-
nizing such basic rights under the Constitution.
13. This Note attempts to contrast the broad, rights-oriented approach of
the Court's previous decisions recognizing protected areas of decisionmaking
with the conduct-specific inquiry applied to consensual homosexual sodomy in
Hardwick.
14. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court noted that under the Con-
stitution, "[v]arious guarantees create zones of privacy." Id. at 484.
15. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(recognizing right of marriage and procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing right of child rearing and education); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right of child rearing and education).
16. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
17. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
1987] NOTE 227
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A. Marriage
In the years following the demise of the economic substantive due
process doctrine, 19 the Court nevertheless continued to recognize non-
enumerated rights as fundamental liberties protected under the four-
teenth amendment. In one important case, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Wil-
liamson,20 the Court recognized a fundamental right of marriage and
procreation implicated by a state law requiring sterilization of certain
habitual felons.21
In a subsequent landmark decision, the Court explicitly recognized
the right of privacy inherent in the marital relationship in Griswold v.
Connecticut.2 2 In Griswold, the Court ruled that a state law23 prohibiting
the use of contraceptives was unconstitutional, in a case involving appli-
cation of the law to married persons and their physicians. 24 The Court
held that several fundamental constitutional guarantees operated to cre-
ate a zone of privacy 25 and that the law violated the protected right of
marital privacy. 26 The Griswold Court clearly emphasized that the Con-
19. For a discussion of this era of fourteenth amendment jurisprudence, see
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
20. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
21. The Court in Skinner invalidated the state law as violative of the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause. Id. at 541. For a discussion of
Skinner, see supra note 5; infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
22. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
23. The statute at issue in Griswold provided in pertinent part: "Any person
who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of prevent-
ing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less
than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned."
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958); "Any person who assists, abets, counsels,
causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted
and punished as if he were the principal offender." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196
(1958).
24. 381 U.S. 485-86. The executive director of Planned Parenthood
League of Connecticut and the medical director of the league at the New Haven
Center were convicted of aiding and abetting under the law after they had ex-
amined married women, given advice, and prescribed contraceptives for their
use. Id. at 480.
25. Id. at 485. Recognizing the demise of the Lochner era and active review
of social and economic legislation, the Court distinguished the case before it,
stating: "We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need,
and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of hus-
band and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation." Id. at
482. After discussing several cases which involved rights not specifically men-
tioned in the Constitution, including Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (protecting the freedom to associate), the Court
reasoned that those cases and others "suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance." 381 U.S. at 482-84.
26. 381 U.S. at 485-86. The Court characterized the right of privacy sur-
rounding the marital relationship as "a right of privacy older than the Bill of
8
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stitution protected a zone of marital privacy and focused on that abstrac-
Rights.... Marriage is... an association for as noble a purpose as any involved
in our prior decisions." Id. at 486. The Court further stated that the marital
association was "intimate to the degree of being sacred." Id.
Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion, emphasized the importance of
the ninth amendment in reasoning that there are additional fundamental rights,
not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, protected from government
infringement. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg stated:
"The Ninth Amendment simply shows the intent of the Constitution's authors
that other fundamental personal rights should not be denied such protection or
disparaged in any other way simply because they are not specifically listed in the
first eight constitutional amendments." Id. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
The ninth amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
People." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Justice Goldberg reasoned that the right of
privacy in the marital relation was a fundamental, personal right retained by the
people. 381 U.S. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan wrote separately, concurring in the judgment, and rejected
any notion that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorpo-
rated precisely those rights established by the words or penumbras of the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan rejected the incorpo-
ration formula espoused by Justice Black in his dissent in Griswold, and reasoned
that judicial restraint would not be served by limiting due process clause liberty
to enumerated constitutional rights when the scope of those enumerated rights
was subject to judicial interpretation. Id. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring). The
approach urged by Justice Harlan in interpreting the due process clause was
insistence on respect for history, emphasis on basic values of our society, and
recognition of the doctrines of separation of powers and federalism. Id. (Harlan,
J., concurring).
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Griswold partially incorporated his
oft-quoted dissent in an earlier case. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). In Poe,
Harlan stated that:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guar-
antees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a
series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property;
the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear
arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on.
It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints ...
and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment
must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the
state needs asserted to justify their abridgement.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Court considered in Poe the constitutional validity of Connecticut laws
prohibiting the use of contraceptives, and held that the asserted claims for de-
claratory judgment did not present a justiciable case or controversy regarding
the constitutionality of the laws. Id. at 509. Harlan disagreed with the judgment
of dismissal, and reached the merits of the constitutional issue. Id. at 539
(Harlan, J., dissenting). While Harlan did not interpret the liberty protected
under the due process clause as limited to rights enumerated in the Constitu-
tion, he did reason that certain historical principles operated to guide the Court
in determining the scope of that liberty. Id. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harlan argued that "[e]ach new claim to Constitutional protection must be con-
sidered against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been ra-
tionally perceived and historically developed." Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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tion-marital privacy-rather than on the specific conduct restricted
under the statute, which was the use of contraceptives. 2
7
Further recognition of the protected constitutional right surround-
ing the marital relationship came in 1967, when the Court invalidated a
Virginia miscegenation statute in Loving v. Virginia.28 In Loving, the
Court ruled that the statute, which prohibited interracial marriage, in-
fringed upon the fundamental right to marry. The Court held that the
law violated the fourteenth amendment's due process and equal protec-
tion clauses, since it deprived the petitioners of a basic civil right. 29
Harlan distinguished the use of contraceptives from other activities prohib-
ited by law, such as adultery, fornication, and homosexuality, since the criminal
prohibition of contraceptive use allowed "the intrusion of the whole machinery
of the criminal law into the very heart of marital privacy." Id. at 553 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The prohibition of the other activities, however, was considered by
Harlan to be valid since they were "intimacies which the law has always forbid-
den and which can have no claim to social protection." Id. (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
Harlan emphasized in Poe that protection of one's privacy, especially in the
home, derived from the home's "pre-eminence as the seat of family life." Id. at
551 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Therefore, Harlan concluded, even if those other
activities were practiced in the home, they were not constitutionally immune
from criminal sanctions. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harlan noted that the laws of this country prohibited contraceptive use be-
ginning soon after the Civil War, but reasoned that enforcement of the Connect-
icut law, based on the state's moral judgment, intruded upon marital intimacy.
Id. at 547-48 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Since marital intimacy was a fundamental
aspect of liberty, including the "privacy of the home in its most basic sense,"
strict scrutiny was required. Id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harlan's influential approach in Poe applied an historical analysis to the
broad right of marital privacy, and found it a basic and fundamental right, re-
gardless of the prevailing statutory prohibition of the use of contraceptives for
the past one hundred years. Harlan distinguished other activities involving pri-
vate, extra-marital sexuality, since these traditionally prohibited activities did
not implicate any fundamental right similar in nature to marital privacy.
In Griswold, Justice White also wrote separately in concurrence, and empha-
sized that the statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated the due pro-
cess clause because it invaded a protected area of privacy without any justifying,
compelling, state interest. 381 U.S. at 503-04 (White, J., concurring).
27. As early as 1873, the mailing, importation, and advertisement or sale of
contraceptive items was prohibited by federal law. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258,
17 Stat. 598 repealed by Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321 § 341, 35 Stat. 1153. See
generally Some Legislative Aspects of the Birth Control Problem, 45 HARv. L. REv. 723
(1932). See also Stone & Pilpel, The Social and Legal Status of Contraception, 22
N.C.L. REV. 212 (1944); Note, Contraceptives and the Law, 6 U. Cm. L. REv. 260
(1939).
28. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Lovings were convicted of violating a statute
that made interracial marriage a felony. Id. at 2-4.
29. Id. at 11-12. The Court subjected the statute to strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause because it established a racial classification, and held
that it served no compelling state purpose. Furthermore, the Court relied on
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), and recognized
that the freedom to marry was one of "the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 388 U.S. at 12. The Court noted
that Virginia was one of sixteen states prohibiting and punishing marriage based
10




The Court has similarly recognized that the due process clause pro-
tects conduct and activity which involves the rights inherent in the basic
unit of our society, the family. The Court recognized the right of rear-
ing and educating one's children as such a family-based right in several
early cases, including Pierce v. Society of Sisters30 and Meyer v. Nebraska.3 1
Although the right protected in Meyer and Pierce was not specifically enu-
merated in the Constitution, the Court nevertheless reasoned that it de-
served protection as a fundamental liberty under the fourteenth
amendment. 3 2 In Meyer, the Court characterized such liberty as the free-
dom "to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,"133 and invalidated a
state law prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language to primary
school children. 34 In Pierce, the Court employed a similar rationale to
strike down a law requiring parents to send their children to public
rather than private schools as an unconstitutional violation of the par-
on racial classifications, and that fourteen states had repealed miscegenation
statutes over the last fifteen years. Id. at 6 n.5.
Interracial marriage had been prohibited in thirty-three states at the time of
ratification of the fourteenth amendment, and twenty-nine states had such stat-
utes in force as late as 1951. See Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitu-
tional and Social Problem, 53 GEO. L.J. 49, 50-51 (1964).
The Court more recently considered the fundamental right of freedom to
marry in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). In Zablocki, the Court invali-
dated a state law which restricted the freedom of a certain class of residents to
marry. Id. at 382. The restricted class was comprised of those residents under a
court-ordered obligation to support a minor child not in his custody, and the
Court held that the statute created a discriminatory classification and infringed
upon a fundamental right. Id. at 383-91. While the majority invalidated the law
under the equal protection clause, Justice Stewart concluded that the law vio-
lated the due process clause, in that it encroached upon a fundamental "liberty,"
and that the issue was properly viewed as an exercise of substantive due process
review. Id. at 392-95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
30. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Pierce involved an appeal by the governor of Ore-
gon from a decree granting an injunction against state enforcement of the Ore-
gon Compulsory Education Act, which required parents to send their children to
public schools. Id. at 529-31. The appellees were several different organizations
operating private schools within the state. Id. at 531-33.
31. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Supreme Court of Nebraska had affirmed the
conviction of a teacher for teaching German to a ten year old in violation of a
state statute. Id. at 396-97. The Court considered the constitutionality of the
statute and reversed the conviction. Id. at 403.
32. In Meyer, the Court characterized the right at issue as the right to direct
the upbringing and education of one's children. Id. at 401. The Court reversed
the teacher's conviction. Id. at 403. Similarly, in Pierce, the Court ruled that the
fourteenth amendment protected the rights of a parent to raise a child, stating
that "rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation
which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
state." 268 U.S. at 535.
33. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
34. Id. at 403.
11
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ents' right to rear their children, as the law bore no reasonable relation-
ship to a valid purpose.3 5
The Supreme Court has discussed the definition of fourteenth
amendment fundamental liberty in a family context more recently in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland.3 6 Emphasizing the importance of the fam-
ily as an institution in our society, the Moore plurality recognized a fun-
damental right implicated by a zoning ordinance which restricted the
use of a single dwelling to a narrowly defined family unit. 37 The Moore
plurality recognized the sanctity of the family as a fundamental right be-
cause respect for the family unit was "deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition."3 8
35. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
36. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
37. Id. at 506 (plurality opinion). The Court invalidated the ordinance and
reversed the conviction of the appellant, a grandmother. Id. The plurality opin-
ion recognized that due process liberty is not limited to the precise terms of
specific guarantees in the Constitution, but "is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions
and purposeless restraints." Id. at 502 (plurality opinion) (quoting Poe v. Ull-
man, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). The plurality also recog-
nized that "certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state
needs asserted to justify their abridgement." Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
38. Id. at 503 (plurality opinion). The Moore plurality noted that no formula
could determine which rights were fundamental, and recognized that limits on
substantive due process come from "solid recognition of the basic values that
underlie our society." Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 501 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Several cases, while decided primarily on grounds that other protected, fun-
damental zones were implicated, involved conduct embraced within the tradi-
tional concept of family, including Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(marriage), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptive use
within marriage). Marriage and procreational activity are cornerstones of the
family relationship in our society. Cases involving protection of procreational
activity include Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678(1977); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52(1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Furthermore, additional cases have considered implication of the family re-
lationship as a fundamental right. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380(1979) (invalidating state law allowing adoption of child without biological fa-
ther's consent where father acted as father to child). But see Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978) (upholding state law requiring only biological mother's
consent to adoption when father did not act as father to child). See also Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977)
(distinguishing foster families from traditional family in terms of fundamental
rights analysis); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding appli-
cation of child labor laws to relative of child in case of public distribution of
religious material; family not beyond regulation in public interest).
Moreover, the Court has recently characterized the personal affiliations pro-
tected in its earlier cases as involving attributes similar to those found in family
relationships. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984).
The Roberts Court described such attributes as "relative smallness, a high degree
232 [Vol. 32: p. 221
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The Supreme Court's recognition of this zone of activity and deci-
sionmaking as a fundamental liberty under the fourteenth amendment
began with Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson.3 9 In Skinner, the Court
relied on the equal protection clause to invalidate a state law requiring
sterilization of certain criminal recidivists. 40 The Skinner Court recog-
nized the right of marriage and procreation as one of the basic rights of
man, "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.' 4 t
The landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut,42 while decided on the
basis of marital privacy, clearly involved conduct which related to
procreational decisionmaking, in the form of freedom to use contracep-
tives.4 3 The effect of the Griswold decision on the recognition of a pro-
tected zone of procreational decisionmaking was more fully explored in
a later case involving a statute restricting the distribution of contracep-
tives, Eisenstadt v. Baird.4 4 The Eisenstadt Court characterized the right of
privacy previously established in Griswold as the protection "from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 4 5
The Supreme Court confronted the question whether the right to
of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion
from others in critical aspects of the relationship." Id. at 620. In Roberts, the
Court considered and rejected a claim that the Jaycees' first and fourteenth
amendment associational rights were violated by application of a state law re-
quiring the Jaycees to accept women as full members. Id. at 620-21. For a dis-
cussion of Roberts, see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
39. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
40. Id. at 541-42. The Court ruled that the statute at issue failed under
strict equal protection scrutiny because a criminal convicted of repeated offenses
of chicken-stealing fell under the statute's sterilization classification while a re-
peatedly convicted embezzler did not. Id. at 538-39. The appellant had been
convicted of stealing chickens and of robbery with firearms. Id. at 537.
41. Id. at 541. Because the legislation affected a basic liberty, the Court
ruled that strict scrutiny of the classification was essential to avoid invidious dis-
crimination. Id.
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. For a discussion of Griswold, see supra notes 22-27 and accompanying
text.
44. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Eisenstadt Court invalidated the Massachu-
setts state law as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 447.
45. Id. at 453. The Eisenstadt Court held that the law, which limited distri-
bution of contraceptives to married persons with a doctor's prescription, pro-
vided dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly
situated. Id. at 447 (citing MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §§ 21, 21A (West
1966)).
Baird was convicted for exhibiting contraceptive items during a lecture on
contraception to a Boston University student group and for giving a package of
contraceptive foam to a woman at the close of the lecture. Id. at 440. The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sustained the conviction for giving away the
foam, and the Sheriff of Suffolk County appealed to the United States Supreme
Court after the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit remanded
13
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terminate one's pregnancy was protected by the due process clause in
Roe v. Wade,46 and invalidated a restrictive abortion statute, 47 holding
that the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty "is broad
the case to the district court which had denied Baird's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Id.
The Court reviewed the law on a rational basis standard, and concluded that
there was no ground that rationally explained the different treatment afforded
married and single persons under the statute. Id. at 447. The Court did not
address the issue of whether a compelling state interest was involved in light of
an invasion of a fundamental right, because the statute failed to satisfy the lesser
rational basis test and violated the guarantee of equal protection. Id. at 447 n.7.
The Court concluded that deterrence of illicit extramarital sex could not
reasonably be recognized as the purpose of the law because that would require
an assumption that Massachusetts had chosen pregnancy and the birth of an
unwanted child as punishment for fornication, a misdemeanor under state law.
Additionally, the law would have no deterrent effect on married persons who
engaged in illicit sex with unmarried persons, since contraceptives were avail-
able to married persons under the law. Id. at 448-49.
The Court also concluded that the law served no health purpose because it
would either restrict access to even non-dangerous contraceptives for married
persons, and be overbroad, or, if a true danger existed, fail to fulfill the need for
a physician to prescribe contraceptive devices for unmarried persons, which de-
vices were legally available to unmarried persons to prevent disease but not con-
ception. Id. at 450-52.
Regarding the law's validity as a prohibition of contraception, the Court
first considered the assumption that under Griswold, the distribution of contra-
ceptives to married persons could not be prohibited. If so, the Court concluded,
then "a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissi-
ble." Id. at 453. Regarding the difference between the right of marital privacy
in Griswold and the right of privacy of unmarried persons, the Court stated: "If
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
Id. (emphasis in original). The Court continued its equal protection analysis by
considering the alternative assumption that under Griswold the state could pro-
hibit the distribution of contraceptives. The Court reasoned that if such were
the case, then the state could not outlaw distribution solely to unmarried per-
sons, and not to married persons, as the evil would be the same in each case and
the statute would be underinclusive. Id. at 454. The Court declined to decide
whether the right of individual access to contraceptives was a fundamental right,
because it reasoned that the rights must be the same for both married and un-
married persons regardless of what those rights were. Id. at 453.
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Jane Roe was a pregnant, single, Texas woman
who sought both a declaratory judgment that the Texas abortion statutes were
unconstitutional, and an injunction against their enforcement by the District At-
torney of Dallas County. Id. at 120; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)
(decided as companion case to Roe).
47. The statute provided in relevant part:
Abortion
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or
knowingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or
medicine, or shall use towards her any violence or means whatever ex-
ternally or internally applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall
be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five
years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment shall be
doubled. By "abortion" is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo
234
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enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy."148 The Court traced the recognition of a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy under the Constitution in its earlier
decisions,4 9 and held that regulation of a protected, fundamental 50 right
shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or that a premature birth
thereof be caused.
Furnishing the means
Whoever furnishes the means for procuring an abortion knowing
the purpose intended is guilty as an accomplice.
Attempt at abortion
If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the offender is
nevertheless guilty of an attempt to produce abortion, provided it be
shown that such means were calculated to produce that result, and shall
be fined not less than one hundred or more than one thousand dollars.
Murder in producing abortion
If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so pro-
duced or by an attempt to effect the same it is murder.
By medical advice
Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or at-
tempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother.
TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. §§ 4512.1-.4, .6 (Vernon 1972).
The Court declared that Jane Roe had standing to undertake the litigation,
and that the termination of her 1970 pregnancy did not render her case moot at
the appellate level. 410 U.S. at 125. However, the Court dismissed the com-
plaint in intervention of a Texas physician seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief in the same action while facing pending state charges for criminal abor-
tion. Id. at 126-27. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the complaint of a
childless married couple as presenting only a speculative possibility of indirect
injury and not an actual case or controversy, even though the wife had received
medical advice that she should avoid pregnancy. Id. at 127-29.
The Court focused on the issue presented by Jane Roe, who sued on behalf
of herself and other members of the class of women unable to legally obtain an
abortion in Texas. Id. at 124-25.
48. 410 U.S. at 153. The Court sketched the development of the concept of
the right of privacy, after conceding that "[t]he Constitution does not explicitly
mention any right of privacy." Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
49. The Court noted its recognition of a right with roots in the first amend-
ment in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); in the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); in the concept of four-
teenth amendment due process liberty in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967). Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
50. The Roe majority recognized the principle to be utilized in determining
which personal rights were protected by the guarantee of personal privacy was
whether the rights were "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)). The Court reasoned that the right of privacy was "founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state ac-
tion." Id. at 153.
The Court did review the history of the legal status of abortion over the
course of western civilization. Id. at 129-47. The Court noted that most of the
state abortion statutes currently in force derived from statutes enacted at the
time of the Civil War. Id. at 139.
Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent, however, that by the time of
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, thirty-six states or territories had
1987] NOTE 235
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could be justified only by a compelling state interest,5 1 and must be nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that interest. 52
The Court has further elaborated on the extent of constitutional
protection of the right to make decisions regarding contraception and
procreation in a number of cases decided after Eisenstadt and Roe. Re-
garding abortion, the Court has held that the state cannot assign an ab-
solute veto power over the right to terminate one's pregnancy to either
the spouse or parent of the individual making the decision. 53 Other re-
strictions on the right to have an abortion have been scrutinized under
the standard of review for state regulation of a fundamental right.
54
laws limiting abortion. Id. at 174-75 & n. 1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist also noted that twenty-one of those laws still remained in force. Id. at
175-76 & n.2 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 154-55. The Court stated:
The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be abso-
lute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amid
that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases
bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated
in the Court's decisions.
Id. at 154.
52. Id. at 155. The majority in Roe set forth an approach that balanced the
interest of the pregnant woman with the state's interest in protecting the wo-
man's health and that of her unborn child, based on the progression of the preg-
nancy. Id. at 162-64. The Court's approach allowed only the pregnant woman
and her doctor to control the abortion decision for the period until approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester; for the period subsequent to the end of the
first trimester the state was free to regulate the procedure in a manner reason-
ably related to its interest in the health of the mother; and for the period subse-
quent to viability, the state was free to regulate or proscribe abortion to promote
its interest in the potentiality of human life, except where abortion was necessary
for the health or life of the mother. Id. at 164-65.
53. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976). In Danforth, the Supreme Court held that provisions of a state law which
required spousal consent for married women, or parental consent for unmarried
minor women, were unconstitutional. Id. at 69, 74. The Court ruled that the
state could not assign a power to veto the abortion decision when it did not
possess such a power itself during the first trimester according to Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). 428 U.S. at 69, 74. This holding exemplified the Court's
post-Roe struggle to define the limits of permissible state regulation of the fun-
damental right to choose whether to terminate one's pregnancy. The Court also
invalidated a provision of the law which prohibited the use of saline amni-
ocentesis after twelve weeks of pregnancy as an arbitrary regulation designed to
prevent the vast majority of abortions during this period, since the method was
the one most commonly used. Id. at 78-79. However, the Court upheld provi-
sions of the statute requiring reporting and recordkeeping as useful to the
state's interest in promoting the mother's health. Id. at 79-81.
In a more recent case, the Court invalidated a state law requiring consent of
both parents of a minor for an abortion, or notice to the parents of judicial
proceedings brought by the minor to obtain a judge's permission in lieu of the
parents' consent. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
54. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986). The Thornburgh Court reaffirmed the holding
of Roe v. Wade and invalidated provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control
Act, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3201-3220 (1983). 106 S. Ct. at 2178. Provisions
236 [Vol. 32: p. 221
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The scope of the right of access to contraceptives was considered in
later cases as well. In one of the contraceptive cases, Carey v. Population
Services International,55 in which the Court invalidated a New York law
limiting the distribution of non-medical contraceptives solely to adults
who purchased them from licensed pharmacists,5 6 the Court empha-
sized the importance of the area of procreational decisionmaking as a
fundamental right.5 7
D. Intimate Association
In Bowers v. Hardwick,58 the dissenting opinion of four justices em-
phasized that the protected interest at issue in the case was the right of
intimate association, "the fundamental interest all individuals have in
controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others." 59 This
section briefly examines that right as touched upon by the Court's ear-
lier privacy decisions and as analyzed by commentators.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,60 the Court discussed the constitu-
tional protection of the "freedom of intimate association" recognized in
its line of cases dealing with "certain kinds of highly personal relation-
ships."'6 1 The Court reasoned that its previous cases protected certain
requiring informed consent, including review of specified informational mate-
rial, provisions requiring a physician's report on the basis for his determination
of non-viability, and provisions establishing special requirements for post-viabil-
ity abortions were ruled unconstitutional. 106 S. Ct. at 2185.
Affirming its previous principles of fundamental rights analysis set forth in
Roe, the Court stated: "[I]t should go without saying that the vitality of these
constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagree-
ment with them." Id. at 2178 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,
300 (1955)). For a discussion of the issues involved in Thornburgh, see Note, The
Third Circuit's Virtual Abrogation of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982-
Outmoded Standards Threaten the Abortion Right, 30 VILL. L. REV. 840 (1985).
55. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
56. The Court stated that "the Constitution protects individual decisions in
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the state." Id. at 687. The
Court held only that state regulation burdening the right to decide whether to
prevent or terminate pregnancy by limiting access to the means to do so had to
meet the standard of a compelling interest. Id. at 688.
57. Id. at 688-89. The Court stated that "the constitutionally protected
right of decision in matters of childbearing.., is the underlying foundation of
the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade." 431 U.S. at 688-89.
58. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
59. Id. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). For a discussion of Roberts, see supra note 38.
61. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. The Court reviewed its earlier decisions in-
volving protected fundamental liberties, including such cases as Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (right of family protected against restrictive
zoning ordinance narrowly defining what constitutes "family"); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of marital privacy protected against contra-
ceptive use prohibition); and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(right of child rearing and education protected against provision requiring pub-
lic and not private education). 468 U.S. at 619.
Griswold, in fact, did arguably rely on previous protection of the right of
19871 NOTE 237
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relationships from state interference in order to safeguard "the ability
independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of
liberty."16 2 Furthermore, the Court has recently characterized the per-
sonal privacy protected under the due process clause as a broad associa-
association. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. The Griswold Court noted its protection
of the peripheral right of freedom of association, derived from the penumbra of
the first amendment, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958). 381 U.S. at 483. NAACP v. Alabama involved the recognition of the fun-
damental constitutional right of association in an appeal from ajudgment of civil
contempt based on the refusal of the NAACP to provide a list of its membership
to the state of Alabama pursuant to a production order arising out of litigation
involving Alabama's statute for registration of a foreign corporation. 357 U.S. at
451,462-63. From this prior protection of a penumbral right, the Griswold Court
reasoned that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
In Roberts, the Court traced its previous recognition of the freedom of asso-
ciation, and noted that two different aspects of associational rights had been
protected. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617. The Court noted that both intimate associa-
tion and expressive association had been protected. Id. at 618.
The Jaycees had challenged a state law requiring them to admit women as
full members and, therefore, the Roberts Court considered whether the associa-
tional rights of the Jaycees fit within the category of constitutionally protected
association as an element of personal liberty. The Court held that the activity of
the Jaycees lacked the characteristics that might protect its relationships under
the constitutional freedom of intimate association. Id. at 621. The relevant fac-
tors to be considered in a determination of whether a relationship qualified for
protection under the right of freedom of intimate association, according to the
Roberts Court, included aspects common to highly personal relationships, such as
"deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals
with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences,
and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life." Id. at 620. The
Court listed such attributes as "relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in
decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in criti-
cal aspects of the relationship." Id. The Court noted that only relationships
with those sorts of attributes "are likely to reflect the considerations that have
led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of
personal liberty." Id. The Roberts Court also rejected the Jaycees' claim that
their freedom of expressive association was violated by the state law requiring
admission of women as regular members. Id. at 622-24.
62. 468 U.S. at 619. The Roberts Court relied on several previous decisions,
including Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right
of procreational choice implicated by contraceptive access restrictions), and
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right of private possession of obscene
material recognized). 468 U.S. at 619.
The Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v. Georgia involved the right of pri-
vate possession of obscene materials in one's home. The Court reversed a con-
viction for private possession of obscene matter, holding that the statute
criminalizing such conduct violated the first and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568. The Court found that the right to receive
ideas and information was fundamental to a free society, and noted that there
was a right "to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusion into one's privacy." d. at 564. The Court then consid-
ered the purposes of the framers of the Constitution and stated: "They con-
ferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Id. (quot-
18
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tional right, stating that "[o]ur cases long have recognized that the
Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of indi-
vidual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government."
6 3
The Court itself has stated, before Bowers v. Hardwick,64 that the
question of whether the right of privacy extends to consensual adult sex-
ual activity was unresolved. 6 5 A substantial number of commentators
have considered that question by exploring and analyzing the Supreme
ing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
Obscene material is not protected under the first amendment, according to
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Stanley Court, however, distin-
guished Roth and its progeny as dealing with public possession or distribution of
obscene material. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 563. The Court then held that the "mere
private possession of obscene material" cannot constitutionally be made a crime.
Id. at 568 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Hardwick Court's analysis of
Stanley, see infra notes 96-97 & 115 and accompanying text.
63. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
106 S. Ct. 2169, 2184 (1986) (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923)). For a discussion of Thornburgh, see supra note 54.
64. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
65. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977). For a
discussion of Carey, see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. In Carey, the
Court considered a suggestion by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion that
the reasoning advanced in the plurality opinion for invalidating the section of
the statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to those under 16 years of
age would subject all state regulation of adult sexual relations to strict judicial
scrutiny. 431 U.S. at 703.
The Court stated in response: " '[The Court has not definitively answered
the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state
statutes regulating [private, consensual sexual] behavior among adults' . . . and
we do not purport to answer that question now." Id. at 688 n.5 (quoting Carey,
431 U.S. at 694 n.17 (plurality opinion)).
Justice Rehnquist in dissent viewed the issue of the constitutionality of regu-
lation of private, consensual adult sexual behavior as definitively established.
Carey, 431 U.S. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)). For a discussion of Doe,
see infra notes 78-80.
The Court discussed other aspects of the right of privacy established in its
earlier decisions as including "the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions." Carey, 431 U.S. at 684 (quoting Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)). The Court then listed the areas of decision in-
volved in its previous cases, including personal decisions "relating to marriage,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. at 453-54; id. at 460, 463-65 (White, J., concurring in result); family
relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rear-
ing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, [262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)]." Carey, 431 U.S. at 685 (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)). The Court emphasized the importance of
the decision whether to beget or bear a child as recognized in the earlier cases in
the context of contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
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Court's cases dealing with various zones of privacy protected under the
fourteenth amendment. 6 6 Some interpretations of the right of privacy
by the commentators have focused on a characterization of the cases as
recognizing a generalized right of individual autonomy in highly per-
sonal decisions and relationships, 6 7 which supports an argument that
the zone of intimate association is a fundamental right. On the other
hand, other commentators have advocated a more limited right of au-
tonomy in areas involving the creation and maintenance of a family. 6 8
113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
66. See, e.g., W. BARNETr, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1973);
Craven, Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699; Eichbaum, To-
wards An Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Famil-
ial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361 (1979); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits
of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Gelfand, Authority and Autonomy: The State, the
Individual and the Family, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125 (1978); Gerety, Doing Without
Privacy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 143 (1981); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977); Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Summer 1980); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM.
L. REV. 1410 (1974); Katz, Sexual Morality and the Constitution: People v. Onofre,
46 ALB. L. REV. 311 (1982); Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on
(and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 417 (1976); Richards, Unnatural Acts
and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281
(1977); Saphire, Gay Rights and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Theory,
Practice, and Dronenburg v. Zech, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 767 (1985); Wilkinson &
White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563
(1977); Wolff, Expanding the Right of Privacy, 27 Loy. L. REV. 1279 (1981); Com-
ment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary and Intimate Decisions, 64 CALIF. L.
REV. 1447 (1976); Note, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L.
REV. 553 (1976); Note, The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156
(1980); Note, Consent, Not Morality, As the Proper Limitation on Sexual Privacy, 4 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 637 (1977); Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private
Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613 (1974); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional
Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670 (1973).
For a discussion of the general legal status of homosexuals, see Rivera, Our
Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
67. One author argues that the substantive value protected in the Court's
cases is the freedom of intimate association, which includes the right of personal
sexual autonomy. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624
(1980). Another author argues that the privacy decisions rest on sexual auton-
omy, the self-determination of the role of sexuality in one's life, and contends
that sexual autonomy is a fundamental experience and right through which peo-
ple define the meaning of their lives. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitu-
tional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979).
According to one author who surveyed the literature on privacy published
between 1965 and 1979, almost all of the authors found support in the privacy
cases for the generalized right of individual autonomy, including sexual auton-
omy. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
83, 98-100 (Summer 1980).
68. One author argues that the privacy cases address rights peculiar to fa-
milial interests, and protect only those specific relational interests and not
purely individual rights of autonomy. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage,
240
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Before Hardwick, courts as well were divided on the issue of whether
private, adult, consensual sexual activity was protected by the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6 9 Against this background, in
Hardwick,70 the Court faced an issue which required that some illumina-
tion be cast on the scope, definition, and rationale of the constitutional
right of privacy, a right that had its beginnings in "penumbras, formed
by emanations," 7 ' and which was characterized on one occasion by the
Court as "defying categorical description. '7 2
III. BOWERS V. HARDWICK
In Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that enforcement of the Geor-
gia sodomy statute 73 at issue did not violate the fundamental constitu-
tional rights of respondent Hardwick under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.74 The case arose when police arrested
Hardwick after observing him engaging in sodomy with another adult
male in the bedroom of his own home. 75 Hardwick was charged with
Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 463 (1983).
69. Several states have upheld the constitutionality of their respective sod-
omy statutes. See, e.g., State v. Poe, 40 N.C. App. 385, 252 S.E.2d 843, cert. de-
nied, 298 N.C. 303, 259 S.E.2d 304 (1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 947 (1980);
State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799, 413 A.2d 58 (1980).
Several state courts have invalidated their respective sodomy statutes on
federal or state constitutional grounds, or both. See, e.g., State v. Pilcher, 242
N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); State v. Saunder, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977);
People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91,415 A.2d 47
(1980). The federal courts have generally upheld challenges to the constitution-
ality of state sodomy statutes. See, e.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (hold-
ing state statute proscribing "crime against nature" not unconstitutionally
vague); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (holding state statute proscrib-
ing "the abominable and detestable crime against nature" not unconstitutionally
vague); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding state sodomy stat-
ute constitutional against both due process and equal protection challenge), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (holding no federal constitutional right to engage in homosexual conduct
protected under either due process right to privacy or equal protection clause).
70. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
71. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). For a discussion of
Griswold, see supra notes 22-27 & 42-43 and accompanying text.
72. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (holding reputation alone not
constitutionally protected interest).
73. The Georgia statute provides, in relevant part: "A person commits the
offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the
sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another." GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-6-2(a) (1984).
74. 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
75. Id. at 2842. A police officer went to Hardwick's house on August 3,
1982, to serve a warrant on Hardwick for failure to pay a fine for public drunken-
ness. A man answering the door stated that he was unsure if Hardwick was
home, but that the officer was free to check if he wanted to. The officer walked
down the hall and observed, through the bedroom door which was ajar, Hard-
19871 NOTE
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violating the state sodomy statute, but the district attorney decided not
to pursue prosecution of the case after an initial hearing. 76 Hardwick
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia, and sought a declaratory judgment that the Georgia sodomy
statute was unconstitutional. 7 7 Relying on the Supreme Court's sum-
mary affirmance of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond,78 the dis-
wick and another man engaging in oral sex. The officer arrested both men and
charged them with sodomy. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1986, at A19, col. 3.
76. 106 S. Ct. at 2842: The district attorney decided not to present the case
to a grand jury after the hearing in municipal court, unless further evidence de-
veloped. Id. Hardwick's attorney, Ms. Kathleen Wilde, stated that "[w]e didn't
know what he meant by further evidence, but that left Michael in never-never
land. The charge of sodomy could be reinstated at any moment. That was the
point at which he decided to challenge the law." N.Y. Times, July 1, 1986, at
A19, col. 3.
77. Hardwick asserted that he regularly engaged in homosexual acts and
would do so in the future. The Eleventh Circuit held that the past arrest of
Hardwick and the threat of future prosecution combined to present a valid antic-
ipatory challenge to the statute and agreed with the district court that Hardwick
had standing to challenge its constitutionality. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d
1202, 1206 (11 th Cir. 1985).
A married couple joined the action, but the district court held that they had
no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, since they were not
arrested or threatened with arrest or prosecution for violating the statute. 106
S. Ct. at 2842 n.2. The Does never claimed membership in a group that was
likely to be prosecuted. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of the Does' complaint for lack of standing. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760
F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
78. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). In Doe,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected the
claims of the several adult, male homosexuals, holding that enforcement of a
Virginia sodomy statute would not deny them constitutional rights under the
fourteenth amendment's guarantees of due process, the first amendment's guar-
antee of freedom of expression, the first and ninth amendments' guarantees of
privacy, or the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. Id. at 1200. The Doe court distinguished the right claimed by the plain-
tiffs in that case from the right of privacy protected in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). 403 F. Supp. at 1200-01. The Doe court interpreted Gris-
wold as conferring a right of marital privacy. Id. The district court especially
relied on justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold, in which he adopted Justice
Harlan's dissenting statement in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting):
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the
State forbids . . . but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institu-
tion which the State not only must allow, but which always and in every
age it has fostered and protected. It is one thing when the State exerts its
power either to forbid extra-marital sexuality... or to say who may marry, but
it is quite another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the inti-
macies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal
law the details of that intimacy.
Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1201 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added)). The district court in Doe further held that the
statute was rationally related to a legitimate state interest, as the prohibited con-
duct was likely to contribute to moral delinquency. Id. at 1202.
[Vol. 32: p. 221
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trict court ruled that Hardwick had failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, and the court, therefore, dismissed the action. 79
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit reversed the ruling of the district court80 and remanded the case for
trial, at which time the state of Georgia would be required to prove that
it had a compelling interest in regulating such conduct and that the stat-
ute was the most narrowly drawn means of doing so. 8 ' The Eleventh
Circuit held that the Constitution prevents the states from interfering in
decisions critical to personal autonomy in areas beyond the legitimate
reach of civilized society.8 2 Relying on the Supreme Court's line of pri-
vacy cases,8 3 the Eleventh Circuit stated that the Georgia statute vio-
79. The district court dismissed Hardwick's claim in exclusive reliance on
the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d
1202, 1204 (11 th Cir. 1985) (citing Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Rich-
mond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)).
80. 760 F.2d at 1210, 1213. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the prece-
dential effect of Doe had to be carefully limited, because in a summary affirmance
the Court does not state its reasons for the disposition of the case. The affirm-
ance represents an approval of the lower court's judgment, but not necessarily
an approval of its reasoning. Id. at 1207. The Eleventh Circuit in Hardwick v.
Bowers reasoned that Doe was an affirmance based on the plaintiffs' lack of stand-
ing, and noted additionally that later doctrinal developments, including implica-
tions from the Court's reasoning in Carey v. Population Services International,
431 U.S. 678 (1977), indicated that the constitutional questions presented in
Hardwick v. Bowers were still unresolved. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1208-
10. For a discussion of Doe, see Ludd, The Aftermath of Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney: In Search of the Right to be Let Alone, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 705 (1985);
Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The Significance of Limited Discre-
tion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U.L. REV. 373 (1972); Note, Hardwick v.
Bowers: An Attempt to Pull the Meaning of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney Out of
the Closet, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973 (1985).
81. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1213. The court held that the statute
infringed on the fundamental privacy rights of Hardwick and, therefore, that the
justification of the state had to meet the compelling interest standard, rather
than the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis standard. Id. at 1211.
82. Id. The court viewed the right of privacy established by the Supreme
Court's earlier decisions as a right of personal autonomy, including a right of
intimate association not limited to marital or family contexts. Id. at 1211-12.
For a discussion of the commentators who share this view of a broad based con-
stitutional right of personal autonomy, see supra note 67.
For a recent discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's analysis of Hardwick v. Bow-
ers, see Note, Constitutional Law: Privacy, Personal Autonomy, and the Freedom of Inti-
mate Association: Hardwick v. Bowers, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 233 (1986).
83. The Eleventh Circuit noted the Supreme Court's protection of impor-
tant, non-procreational associational interests in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting sanctity of marital relationship), and Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (protecting intimacy outside of marital relationship).
Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1211-12. The court stated that "[t]he intimate
association protected against state interference does not exist in the marriage
relationship alone" and noted that the sexual intimacy at issue served the same
purpose as marriage for some persons. Id. at 1212. The Eleventh Circuit also
relied on the protection of the privacy interest involved in activities occurring
within the home in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (protecting private
possession of obscene material). Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1212.
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lated Hardwick's fundamental rights, because the activity Hardwick
engaged in was "quintessentially private and ... at the heart of an inti-
mate association beyond the proper reach of state regulation." '84
On certiorari, the Supreme Court first rejected the argument that
any prior cases decided by the Court had recognized a constitutional
right of privacy that extended to private, adult, consensual homosexual
activity. 85 The Court reasoned that its previous decisions establishing
fundamental personal rights of privacy involved the specific areas of
child rearing and education, family, marriage, and procreational
choice.86 The Court distinguished the activity of homosexual sodomy8 7
84. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1212. The court held that Hardwick's
activity was protected under the ninth amendment and the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, and cited respectively Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting intimate association of marriage), and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (due process embodies notion of fundamental fairness pro-
tecting private area from reach of state regulation). Hardwick v. Bowers, 760
F.2d at 1212-13.
85. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
86. Id. at 2843-44. The Court relied on the characterization of its previous
decisions announced in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S.
678, 685 (1977). Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2843. The Hardwick Court stated:
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923), were described as dealing with child rearing and edu-
cation; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), with family relation-
ships; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), with
procreation; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), with marriage; Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, supra, and Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra, with contracep-
tion; and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), with abortion. The latter
three cases were interpreted as construing the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to confer a fundamental individual right to
decide whether or not to beget or bear a child.
106 S. Ct. at 2843-44 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685,
688-89 (1977)). For a discussion of Carey, see supra notes 55-57 & 65 and accom-
panying text.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun rejected the majority's charac-
terization of the Court's privacy decisions. 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun, joined in his opinion by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall and Stevens, reasoned that the Court had protected privacy rights in its
previous cases "because they form so central a part of an individual's life." Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that sexual intimacy was an
important part of human existence and "that the 'ability independently to define
one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty' cannot truly be exercised
in a vacuum; we all depend on the 'emotional enrichment of close ties with
others.' " Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
87. The Court focused solely on the issue of whether the Georgia sodomy
statute was unconstitutional as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy.
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2842 n.2. Hardwick was the sole respondent, and as-
serted that he was a homosexual who regularly engaged in consensual homosex-
ual sodomy. Id. at 2842.
As a corollary to the case and controversy requirement, the Supreme Court
has developed rules for limiting constitutional questions in cases over which it
has jurisdiction, including a policy of self-restraint in which constitutional issues
affecting legislation are not determined in broader terms than that required by
24
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from the specific activities protected in its earlier cases,88 and rejected
the claim "that these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that
any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is consti-
tutionally insulated from state proscription."-8 9
Having concluded that the case was not controlled by extant prece-
dent, the Court discussed the principles it had used in determining
which rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution qualify for
heightened judicial protection under the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. 90 The Court characterized such funda-
the precise facts to which the ruling is to be applied. See Rescue Army v. Munici-
pal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947) (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
Justice Blackmun found the majority's "obsessive focus on homosexual ac-
tivity" unjustifiable. 106 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He pointed
out that the sex or status of the persons engaging in sodomy was irrelevant ac-
cording to the language of the state statute. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Blackmun further noted that several Georgia Supreme Court decisions had
failed to apply an earlier form of the statute to lesbian or heterosexual sodomy.
Id. at 2849 n. 1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Georgia then enacted the current
form of the statute, which more broadly prohibited sodomy by specific physical
description and eliminated any reference to the sex of the persons involved. Id.
at 2849 & n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For the text of the present Georgia
statute, see supra note 73.
88. 106 S. Ct. at 2844. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, reasoned that the ma-
jority decided more than whether the right to engage in homosexual sodomy is a
fundamental right; he concluded that the Court had refused to recognize "the
fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their inti-
mate associations with others." Id. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. 106 S. Ct. at 2844. The majority in Hardwick relied on two footnotes in
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 & 694 n.17.
106 S. Ct. at 2844. For a discussion of Carey, see supra notes 55-57 & 65 and
accompanying text.
90. 106 S. Ct. at 2844. The Court essentially focused on whether the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment proscribed Georgia's restrictions
on Hardwick's right to engage in consensual, homosexual sodomy. Id. The
Court refused to consider whether the Georgia sodomy statute violated Hard-
wick's rights under the ninth amendment, the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment or the eighth amendment, because Hardwick did not de-
fend the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit on those grounds. Id. at 2846 n.8.
Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, argued that because the case
was before the Court on the petitioner's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court was obligated to determine if
any possible theory entitled respondent to relief. Id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). Justice Blackmun noted that homosexual activity could be considered
as a condition, and that under the eighth amendment analysis in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding eighth amendment prohibited punish-
ing drug addict for his status), and Justice White's concurrence in Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 550-51 n.2 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (stating key to
inquiry is whether "volitional acts brought about the 'condition' "), the Consti-
tution may bar punishment for activities attributable to homosexuality. 106 S.
Ct. at 2850 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun additionally noted that because the Georgia statute was
gender-neutral, the state's exclusive interest in its application to homosexuals
raised serious questions of discriminatory enforcement under the fourteenth
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mental liberties as those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"9 1
or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"9 2 and held, fo-
cusing on the specific conduct at issue, that the right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy did not conform to either of those principles.
9 3
amendment's equal protection clause. Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Regarding
whether homosexuals constituted a suspect class under equal protection analy-
sis, Justice Blackmun noted that the equal protection claim might well be avail-
able without reaching that controversial question. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citing Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985) (arguing that "heightened scrutiny in
cases involving discrimination against gays is justified by an analysis of the con-
cerns that should and do lie behind our current conceptions of suspectness")).
Justice Stevens, in dissent, first considered and rejected the idea that the
gender-neutral Georgia statute could totally prohibit sodomy, concluding that
under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the state could not prohibit
sodomy within marriage. 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens additionally noted that the Georgia Attorney General conceded that
point at oral argument. Id. at 2858 n. 10 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
concluded that sodomy between unmarried, heterosexual adults would be con-
stitutionally protected as well, under Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(invalidating contraceptive distribution prohibition restricting access by unmar-
ried persons). 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens then considered whether selective application of the sodomy
statute would violate the equal protection clause. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
He noted that no justification existed for selective application of the law, and
that the Georgia legislature only expressed a belief that all sodomy was immoral,
as the sodomy law did not focus on homosexuals as a special classification. Id. at
2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell wrote separately in concurrence, and stated that a prison sen-
tence for violation of the sodomy statute might implicate the eighth amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. He concluded, however, that
since Hardwick had not been tried, convicted, or sentenced, the eighth amend-
ment claim was not properly before the Court. Id. at 2847-48 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
91. 106 S. Ct. at 2844 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)). For a discussion of Palko, see supra note 4.
92. 106 S. Ct. at 2844 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
93. 106 S. Ct. at 2844-46. The Court analyzed the legal status accorded
sodomy throughout history and stated that laws against sodomy "have ancient
roots." Id. at 2844. The Court noted that sodomy was forbidden by the com-
mon law and by the laws of the original thirteen states as of 1791. Id. at 2844 &
n.5. The Court further noted that in 1868, when the fourteenth amendment was
ratified, thirty-two of the thirty-seven states had laws criminalizing sodomy. Id.
at 2844-45 & n.6. The Court found that all the states criminalized sodomy as
late as 1961, and that twenty-four states and the District of Columbia still did so.
Id. at 2845-46 & n.7 (citing Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context
of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 524 n.9 (1986) [hereinafter cited
as Survey]).
The Court failed to mention, however, that of the twenty-four jurisdictions
currently imposing criminal sanctions on sodomy, only six explicitly prohibit
consensual, homosexual conduct. See Survey, supra at 525 n.10. The six states
are: Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, and Texas. Id. The
nineteen jurisdictions imposing criminal sanctions on any individuals who en-
gage in oral or anal intercourse are Alabama, Arizona, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
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Furthermore, Justice White stated for the majority that the Court
"comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitu-
tional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design
of the Constitution."'94 This danger called for a reluctance, according to
the majority in Hardwick, to give a broad reading to the liberty protected
under the due process clause when presented with invitations to rede-
fine the existing contours of the notion of penumbral rights. 95
The Court distinguished Stanley v. Georgia,96 stating that the right
protected in Stanley was clearly derived from the first amendment. 97
The Court further reasoned that not all conduct illegal when it occurs
outside the home is protected merely by virtue of occurring within the
home.9 8 Finally, given that the right to engage in private, consensual
Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Utah, and Virginia. Id. at 524 n.9 & 525 n.10. See generally Hardwick, 106 S. Ct.
at 2847 (tracing history of laws prohibiting sodomy from Roman law, through
English Reformation, and up to Blackstone's Commentaries) (Burger, CJ.,
concurring).
After this historical analysis, the Court characterized the claim that a right to
engage in sodomy conformed to principles of due process clause analysis as "at
best, facetious." 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
In dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that the length of time a law commanded
majority support did not necessarily confirm its constitutionality. Id. at 2854
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He wrote:
[I]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Id. at 2848 (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897)) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 2846. Justice White noted that the judicial activism marked by
substantive due process review was largely repudiated after the conflict between
President Roosevelt and the Court in the 1930s. Id. For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's pre-1937 interpretation of due process liberty, see supra note 3
and accompanying text.
95. 106 S. Ct. at 2846. The Court stated that expansion of the substantive
scope of the fifth and fourteenth amendments' due process clauses should be
resisted, especially if it calls for a redefinition of fundamental rights. "Other-
wise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the
country without express constitutional authority." Id.
96. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that first and fourteenth amendments
prohibit making criminal private possession of obscene material). For a discus-
sion of Stanley, see supra note 62.
97. 106 S. Ct. at 2846. The Court emphasized that Stanley was grounded in
a specific provision of the Constitution and that it protected the right to possess
and read books or films in one's home. Id. The Court stated that the right to
engage in sodomy had no such support in any provision of the Constitution. Id.
Justice Blackmun disagreed with the Court's reading of Stanley. Id. at 2852
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun reasoned that the Stanley Court re-
lied on the fourth amendment as much as the first amendment, as it emphasized
the special protection of an individual in his home. Id. at 2852-53 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
98. 106 S. Ct. at 2846. The Court reasoned that if voluntary sexual conduct
between adults was constitutionally protected when it took place in private, no
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sodomy is not a fundamental right, the Court ruled that the presumed
majority sentiment that homosexuality is immoral was an adequate and
rational basis to support the Georgia statute.9 9
IV. ANALYSIS
The reasoning of the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick 100 can be
viewed as essentially embodying a two-step process of analysis. The
Court reasoned as follows:
(1)(A) The prior cases construing the fourteenth amendment's
protection of non-enumerated rights have definitively established funda-
mental rights only in the areas of marriage, the family, and procreational
choice.
(B) The right to engage in consensual, homosexual sodomy is
not a right which involves the areas of marriage, the family, or procrea-
tional choice.
(C) Therefore, the prior cases have not definitively established a
fundamental right to engage in consensual, homosexual sodomy.
(2)(A) Only those non-enumerated rights implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty or rooted in the history and tradition of the nation are
fundamental rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection under
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
(B) The right to engage in consensual, homosexual sodomy is
not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or rooted in the history
and tradition of the nation.
(C) Therefore, the right to engage in consensual, homosexual
sodomy is not a fundamental right qualifying for heightened judicial
protection under the due process clause.
The majority's reasoning began with a characterization of its earlier
privacy cases as establishing the right of privacy in only certain specific,
protected zones of personal decisionmaking and activity.' 0 1 The major-
ity's brief analysis of the privacy cases focused on the specific areas pro-
tected, failing to state an explicit principle or concept which would link
simple distinction could be made regarding the protection of adultery, incest,
and other sex offenses. Id.
99. Id. Reasoning that the law "is constantly based on notions of morality,"
the Court concluded that moral choices properly served as the basis for many
laws. Id. This question was not actually at issue in Hardwick, however, since the
case came before the Court after the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and
remanded to the district court to determine if a compelling state interest justi-
fied the law. The issue before the Court, then, was whether the Eleventh Circuit
applied the proper standard of review.
100. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
101. Id. at 2843-44. The Court listed its previous line of cases dealing with
personal fundamental rights as characterized in Carey v. Population Services In-
ternational, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977). For a discussion of Carey, see supra notes
55-57.
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the factual situations involved. Thus, the Supreme Court in Hardwick
reasoned that its previous cases established a right of privacy protecting
personal autonomy in the limited areas of marriage, family, and procrea-
tion, and rejected the notion that its cases had established protection of
personal autonomy in the area of non-marital, private, consensual, adult
sexual conduct. 10 2
The majority's characterization of the cases which "construed the
Constitution to confer a right of privacy"' 1 3 involved a narrow reading
of the cases and strictly limited the holdings of those cases to the factual
scenarios involved. However, such a narrow reading of the cases, limit-
ing the reach of the previously defined right of privacy, is supported by
the reasoning and language of the earlier decisions. 10 4 For example,
Griswold,1° 5 which dealt with a married couple's right to use contracep-
tives necessarily shielded certain adult, non-procreational sexual activity
from state regulation. Even then, however, only intimate activity which
took place within the bounds of a marital relationship was protected.i06
Even in Eisenstadt v. Baird,107 in which the Court invalidated a law re-
stricting access to contraceptives as applied to unmarried persons on
equal protection grounds, 10 8 the Court did not hold that unmarried per-
sons had a fundamental right to use contraceptives, only that "whatever
the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights
must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike." 10 9 Thus,
even if one argues that, read broadly, Griswold protects the entire range
of intimate marital conduct, within the zone of marital privacy, the Court
102. 106 S. Ct. at 2844. For a discussion of the question of whether this
issue had been resolved by the Court's earlier cases, see supra note 65 and ac-
companying text.
103. 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
104. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (freedom to marry one
of "vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
man"); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization
law involved "basic civil right of man" and "marriage and procreation are funda-
mental to the very existence and survival of the race"); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right of child rearing protected); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (emphasizing rights involved in directing upbringing of
children but mentioning no right of privacy in sexual conduct).
105. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a discussion of Griswold, see supra notes 22-
27 & 42-43 and accompanying text.
106. In Griswold, the Court considered the constitutional protection of "a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental con-
stitutional guarantees." 381 U.S. at 485. The Court held that the relationship
of marriage was within the zone of privacy protected by the Constitution, and
emphasized that the right of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship was
older than the Bill of Rights and involved an association "intimate to the degree
of being sacred." Id. at 486.
107. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). For a discussion of Eisenstadt, see supra notes 44-
45 and accompanying text.
108. 405 U.S. at 454-55.
109. Id. at 453.
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in Eisenstadt did not give Griswold such a reading.1 1 0
The Eisenstadt Court, in interpreting the right of privacy established
in Griswold, never claimed that Griswold protected all forms of marital
sexual intimacy. In fact, the majority in Eisenstadt refused to decide
whether Griswold protected the rights of access to contraceptives at all.
Therefore, it seems unreasonable to claim that Eisenstadt must be read as
establishing a right of privacy regarding intimate sexual conduct be-
tween unmarried adults through its extension of Griswold's protection to
unmarried as well as married individuals. The clear focus in Eisenstadt
was on the equal right of unmarried and married individuals to have
access to contraceptives, whatever those rights may be.' 1
While the Court's decision to protect the right of an unmarried
Texas woman to abortion in Roe v. Wade1 12 could be seen as implicit
protection of extra-marital sex, the Court clearly distinguished the deci-
sion whether to bear a child from the decision whether to engage in
sexual activity. 1' 3 The entire focus in Roe was on the area of procrea-
tional choice, not on the area of sexual intimacy.
In sum, the line of cases establishing and defining the right of pri-
vacy may reasonably be interpreted as definitively creating a right of pri-
vacy only in certain specific areas of choice or activity. The Court's
conclusion that the line of privacy cases decided before Hardwick does
not clearly establish that "any kind of private sexual conduct between
consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscrip-
tion" 1 14 is supportable by a reasonable analysis of the prior cases."15
110. Eisenstadt simply declared that if the right of choice regarding
"whether to bear or beget a child" was protected in Griswold, then that protected
right was equally applicable to the individual, married or single. Id.
111. Id.
112. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a discussion of Roe, see supra notes 46-52
and accompanying text.
113. The Court briefly considered the deterrence of illicit, extra-marital
sexual conduct as a possible justification for the state abortion restrictions, but
concluded that no court or commentator had taken that argument seriously and
noted that the appellee, Texas, did not advance this argument. 410 U.S. at 148.
114. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
115. The Court's major premise in its first syllogism, involving characteri-
zation of the privacy precedent, is reasonable. The Court's minor premise in
that first argument, in which homosexual sodomy is characterized as not involv-
ing marriage, family or procreation, is also reasonable. The Court's conclusion
in its first argument, that the right to engage in homosexual sodomy is not
clearly or definitively established by its earlier cases, is, therefore, justifiably
reached.
However, an alternative characterization of the privacy precedent could be
advanced, relying on the language of Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609 (1984) (characterizing right protected as "freedom of intimate association"
and recognizing protected personal relationships which share attributes of type
found in family relationship). For a discussion of Roberts, see supra notes 38 &
60-62 and accompanying text.
Justice Blackmun argued for a broader characterization of the privacy cases
in his dissent in Hardwick, and saw the cases as recognizing a "private sphere of
250 [Vol. 32: p. 221
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The next step in the Court's analysis in Hardwick, assuming that the
court's earlier privacy decisions did not require the recognition of the
right to engage in homosexual sodomy as a fundamental constitutional
right, was to consider whether those cases precluded the recognition of
such a right. An alternative formulation of this question is whether the
principles and reasoning of the Court's earlier privacy cases permitted a
logical extension of the protected zones of privacy previously an-
nounced to the zone at issue in this case, the area of intimate sexual
association.
The Court sought to identify the principles governing its applica-
tion of the due process clause in previous cases which had recognized
substantive rights with "little or no textual support in the constitutional
language."' 116 The stated premise in the Court's analysis was that only
those non-enumerated rights "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty,""l7 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition""18
individual liberty" beyond state control. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2850 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2184 (1986)). For a discussion of Thorn-
burgh, see supra notes 54 & 63 and accompanying text.
The Hardwick majority, however, failed to include, in its list of previous deci-
sions recognizing fundamental rights not specifically enumerated in the Consti-
tution, the important case of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The
exclusion of Stanley from the list of cases was a critical part of the first syllogism
in the Court's analysis, because if Stanley were considered as one of the Court's
non-enumerated rights decisions the narrow characterization of those decisions
by the Hardwick Court would be inconsistent with the holding and rationale of
Stanley.
The opinion of the Court in Stanley does include an acknowledgement of the
fundamental "right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from un-
wanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy." Id. at 564. This language
tends to support a reading of Stanley as a privacy case based on more than rights
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. The main thrust of the Stanley ma-
jority, however, is that the first amendment protects the right of the individual to
possess printed or filmed material in his home, and that this enumerated right is
the source of the fundamental liberty protected from state proscription by the
fourteenth amendment. Stanley emphasized the privacy aspect of the home in
distinguishing the protected status of possession of obscene material in one's
home from the unprotected status of public possession or distribution of ob-
scene material under the first amendment. Id. at 567-68. The Court's conclu-
sion in Hardwick that Stanley was grounded in the first amendment is reasonable.
For a discussion of Stanley, see supra notes 62 & 96-97 and accompanying text.
116. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
117. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). In Palko,
the Court applied this characterization of fundamental liberty in determining
that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment was not applicable to the
states under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 302 U.S. at 322.
The specific holding of Palko was overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969). The Supreme Court also quoted this definitional principle of fundamen-
tal personal rights analysis in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). For a
discussion of Roe, see supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
118. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)). For a discussion of Moore, see
supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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were fundamental rights worthy of "heightened judicial protection"
under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 1 19
This formulation of fundamental rights analysis principles is a valid
step in the Court's reasoning. The minor premise in the Court's second
syllogism, however, involved a more difficult application of these princi-
ples to the right asserted by respondent Hardwick. A reasonable ap-
proach to this problem should include not only the quotation of the
same principles that governed the earlier non-enumerated fundamental
rights decisions, but an application of those general principles in a man-
ner consistent with their application in the earlier cases. Therefore, the
Hardwick majority's application of fundamental rights analysis principles
must be carefully examined.
The Hardwick majority began its evaluation of the right to engage in
consensual homosexual sodomy by reviewing the history of the legal sta-
tus of sodomy in the United States. Noting that sodomy had been out-
lawed by a majority of the states until very recently,' 2 0 the Court
concluded that the right to engage in sodomy was not consistent with
the principles announced as the basis for recognizing a fundamental
right under the due process clause. 12 1 The Court then reasoned that
recognition of non-enumerated fundamental rights under the four-
teenth amendment beyond the category defined by the announced prin-
ciples drew the Court near to the bounds of its constitutional authority,
and concluded that the right asserted by Hardwick was not a fundamen-
tal constitutional right.12 2
The essential problem in the Hardwick majority's analysis is in its
application of the principles of fundamental rights analysis to the right
asserted by respondent Hardwick. The Court, in applying and defining
those general principles, focused on the historical legal status of the spe-
cific conduct involved, rather than on the more general right implicated
by the state's proscription of that conduct. In doing so, the Court ap-
plied those principles in a manner inconsistent with the application of
those general principles in its earlier cases, including the landmark deci-
sions of Griswold 123 and Roe. 12 4
In Griswold, the Court's decision was based on the more general
right of marital privacy implicated by a ban on the use of contracep-
tives, 125 not on an historical analysis of the legal status of the specific
119. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
120. Id. at 2844-46. For a discussion of the Court's historical analysis, see
supra note 93 and accompanying text.
121. 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
122. Id.
123. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a discussion of Griswold, see supra notes 22-
27 & 42-43 and accompanying text.
124. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a discussion of Roe, see supra notes 46-52
and accompanying text.
125, Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
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conduct at issue. In Roe, the Court's decision was based on the broader
right of procreational choice infringed by a near total ban on abor-
tion, 12 6 not on an historical analysis of abortion's legal status in
America. 12
7
The Hardwick majority's analysis, on the other hand, clearly empha-
sized the legal status of sodomy throughout our nation's history. The
Court emphasized the dates of the ratification of the Bill of Rights and
the fourteenth amendment as important reference points in evaluation
of the status of the conduct as a fundamental right, and appeared to
ignore any recent trend toward reversal of the earlier prohibition of the
specific conduct.
1 28
The Court's functional definition of fundamental rights principles
under the fourteenth amendment in Hardwick, if it were applied to the
facts of several of the Court's earlier decisions, would produce results
opposite those reached in the earlier cases. For example, in Griswold,'29
the specific conduct involved was the use of contraceptives. The adver-
tisement, distribution, and use of contraceptives, however, was regu-
lated by federal statute as early as 1873.130 Under the Hardwick analysis,
the right to use contraceptives would not be "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,"' 13 1 and thus not a protected, fundamental right. Simi-
larly, the Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia,132 invalidating a state
miscegenation statute on equal protection and due process grounds, is
inconsistent1 3 3 with the test applied in Hardwick. Miscegenation was
prohibited by law in America as early as 1661, and by the time of the
ratification of the fourteenth amendment, thirty-three states had misce-
genation statutes in force.' 34 Any assertion by the Loving Court that the
right to marry across racial boundaries was historically accorded pro-
126. Roe, 410 U.S, at 153.
127. The Court did, however, trace the development of laws regulating
abortion, noting that "the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a major-
ity of States today are of relatively recent vintage." Id. at 129, 130-47.
128. See Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844-46.
129. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding marital privacy in context of contracep-
tion protected by Constitution).
130. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598, repealed by Act of Mar. 4,
1909, ch. 321, § 341, 35 Stat. 1153. For a discussion of contraceptive regula-
tion, see supra note 27.
131. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)).
132. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). For a discussion of Loving, see supra notes 28-29
and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Hardwick, noted that
in Loving the state relied on a religious justification for its miscegenation law,
and noted that the lower court in Loving had stated that God had created sepa-
rate races of men and placed them on separate continents. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct.
at 2854 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. This hypothetical analysis of Loving focuses on the recognition of mar-
riage as a fundamental right under the Court's due process clause analysis, and
not on the equal protection prong of Loving.
134. Applebaum, supra note 29, at 50-51.
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tected legal status would have been unsupportable, and thus under the
Hardwick historical conduct-specific analysis the conduct would have
failed to achieve fundamental right status.
The Court's landmark decision in Roe v. Wade 135 would likewise fail
the Hardwick test. Historical review of the legal status of abortion in the
United States would reveal that in 1868 thirty-six states or territories
had enacted laws limiting abortion. 13 6 Thus, another major decision of
the Court would have resulted in the opposite conclusion if the Hardwick
mode of application of fundamental rights principles had been
employed.
The Hardwick analysis can be viewed as creating a double-tiered test
for non-enumerated fundamental privacy rights analysis under the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. First, the factual scenario in
which the right is asserted is compared against the specific zones in
which a fundamental privacy right has been recognized. Only those
rights involving essentially identical factual situations as those previ-
ously recognized are accorded fundamental rights status under the ra-
tionale of the Court.
A different, more stringent test is applied to any right claimed to be
fundamental which is not asserted in a factual scenario essentially identi-
cal to the previously recognized zones of privacy. This test involves an
historical analysis of the legal status of the specific conduct involved,
and conduct which has generally been legally prohibited or restricted in
the past cannot reach the level of a fundamental constitutional right
qualifying for heightened judicial protection. The approach taken in
Hardwick results in the continued protection of fundamental, non-enu-
merated rights which have already been established, while any right as-
serted in a different factual context is subject to a more difficult standard
which focuses on the historical acceptance of such conduct. This ap-
proach results in the freezing of fundamental rights under the due pro-
cess clause' 37 to those interest-specific areas already recognized and
those specific activities which historically have enjoyed legally-accepted
status.
The result of the Hardwick majority's approach can be appreciated
more clearly when it is compared with the process of abstraction and
analysis employed in previous fundamental rights cases. The traditional
analysis of a non-enumerated fundamental rights claim under the due
process clause involves a three-step process of abstraction. The specific
conduct which was prohibited by the challenged statute lies within zone
one, the "zone of specific behavior," the primary step in the process of
135. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
136. Id. at 175-77 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
137. See Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing
that length of time majority holds convictions cannot withdraw legislation from
Court's scrutiny).
254 [Vol. 32: p. 221
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analysis. This zone requires no abstraction and signifies the specific
conduct exercised by the citizen.
Next, the conduct from zone one is abstracted to the next level, in
which the basic value implicated by the exercise of the conduct is consid-
ered. This second zone is the "zone of protected values." The right or
value in zone two is then tested for its validity as a fundamental right
under the due process clause, by applying the principles in the third
zone to the zone two value. This third zone is the "zone of protected
liberty," and the zone two value is considered in the light of these prin-
ciples to determine whether the value comports with these principles,
and if so, the value is construed as a fundamental right under the due
process clause.
The operation of this mode of analysis can be illustrated by a dia-
gram of the rights asserted in previous non-enumerated fundamental
rights cases considered by the Court and the level of abstraction in-
volved in decisions to protect those rights under the Constitution.
Zone I Zone 2 Zone 3
contraceptive implicit in the
Griswold v. Connecticut use within - marital concept ofmarital privacy ordered
relationship liberty
residing with
Moore v. City of East ones sanctity of the or fundamental
Cleveland grandchildren family f rights
related as f
cousins
termination freedom of deeply rooted
Roe v. Wade of one's - procreational in nation's
pregnancy choice history and
traditions
Zone of Zone of Zone of
specific protected protected
behavior values liberty
The specific behavior at issue in these cases was considered in light
of the broader value implicated by exercise of that behavior. That value
was considered in light of the broader principles which defined the
scope of non-enumerated due process liberties or fundamental rights.
The Hardwick majority appeared to recognize this process when it ac-
cepted the characterization of the earlier privacy cases in Carey as involv-
ing the zone two values of marriage, family, and procreation.'
3 8
Furthermore, the Hardwick Court recognized the broader zone three
principles, which govern the analysis of the values to determine whether
the asserted right is a fundamental right, as a means to "identify the
nature of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection."13 9
138. Id. at 2843-44.
139. Id. at 2844.
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The Hardwick majority concluded that the asserted right to engage
in homosexual sodomy did not implicate any of the values heretofore
accepted as zone two protected values. The Court then subjected the
zone one conduct, homosexual sodomy, to analysis under zone three
principles, bypassing the customary process of abstraction to a zone two
value. In doing so, the Court created the appearance of a new conduct-
specific standard of due process review since no zone one value had pre-
viously been subjected to a pure zone three analysis. 140 The Hardwick
majority, therefore, deviated from the traditional pattern of analysis, as
illustrated here:





Bowers v. Hardwick homosexual or fundamental
sodomy rights
deeply rooted
(freedom of in nation's
intimate history and
association) traditions
Zone of , Zone of /Zone of
specific protected protected
behavior van ues liberty
The impact of the Hardwick majority's failure to follow the traditional
pattern of fundamental rights analysis is that the Court avoided con-
fronting the critical question of whether a zone two value, perhaps inti-
mate association, was implicated by the behavior engaged in by
Hardwick and whether that value qualified as a fundamental right under
the liberty principles of zone three.
The Hardwick majority justified its analysis by pointing to the con-
flict between the Court and the Executive in the 1930's, which was ar-
guably a factor in the abandonment of the doctrine of economic
substantive due process. 14 ' The Hardwick majority cautioned against
140. Justice Blackmun stated in Hardwick that "the right to privacy is more
than the mere aggregation of a number of entitlements to engage in specific
behavior." Id. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He further stated:
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in homosex-
ual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare .... than Stanley v.
Georgia... was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or
Katz v. United States ... was about a fundamental right to place inter-
state bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is about "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,"
namely, "the right to be let alone."
Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)'(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (citations omitted).
141. For a discussion of this conflict and the period of economic substan-
tive due process review, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
256 [Vol. 32: p. 221
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redefining the category of rights deemed fundamental.14 2 The conduct-
specific historical analysis employed in Hardwick, however, appears to
come close to doing just that.
The Hardwick majority sought to ensure that the recognition of
rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution involved "more
than the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the States
and the Federal Government."' 43 The determination of the existence
of fundamental rights under the due process clause involves a choice of
whether an asserted right is such a fundamental liberty that any law
which interferes with the exercise of that right must be justified by a
compelling interest. 144
It is submitted that a controlling principle should be established to
define and unify the fundamental right of privacy. Any assessment of an
asserted right should include an evaluation of the values implicated in
the exercise of that right and the similarity of those values to the essen-
tial values protected by the right of privacy. A fundamental rights analy-
sis based on specific value-oriented principles, whether the approach be
based on a principle of procreational and familial values or on a princi-
ple embodying values of personal autonomy in matters of intimate asso-
ciation, would result in a clearer, more useful body of constitutional law.
Even more general principles of analysis could be applied consist-
ently, if a specific analytical process consistent with previous decisions
were set forth to determine which rights are indeed fundamental liber-
ties protected by the fourteenth amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
No longer will fundamental rights jurisprudence represent the
growth and development of our societal values. Those values are now
frozen in time. The Hardwick decision marks the Court's refusal to con-
tinue the process of abstracting the conduct-specific question at issue to
the broader value implicated by state regulation of the activity. In this,
the decision is unfortunate. Analytically and functionally, the Court has
called a halt to the reasoned maturation of fundamental rights jurispru-
dence. In this, the decision is tragic.
A determination whether a right "not readily identifiable in the
Constitution's text," 14 5 is a fundamental liberty should involve more
than "the Justices' own choice of values."' 46  Consistency in the
processes employed in analysis of those rights and values, and a coher-
ent principle defining the scope of non-enumerated fundamental rights
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment could only
142. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
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